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I.

Introduction

Hard work, dedication, and perseverance won the United States Women’s National
Soccer Team (USWNT) global recognition for their record breaking wins. 1 The team holds four
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup titles, but faces a tougher
game against the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) in the United States District Court
Central District of California Western Division. 2
In March 2019, the USWNT filed a sex discrimination suit against the United States
Soccer Federation in Morgan et al. v. United States Soccer Federation.3 The women’s team
alleges that despite its superior performance to the United States Men’s National Soccer Team
(USMNT), their pay amounts to only half what male players earn. 4 The USWNT has filed a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA or the Act). 6
In its class action lawsuit under the EPA, the USWNT asserts differences in playing,
training and travel conditions, promotion of their games, and support and development. 7 The
EPA requires that men and women doing substantially equal jobs are to be paid at the same rate. 8
The Act offers four affirmative defenses available to defendants. 9 In opposition, the United
States Soccer Federation asserts the third defense under the Act, a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production, and the fourth defense, a differential based on any

See Andrew Das, Pay Disparity in U.S. Soccer? It’s Complicated, N.Y. TIMES (April 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/sports/soccer/usmnt-uswnt-soccer-equal-pay.html.
2 See id.
3 See Compl. at 1:8-9, Morgan v. United States Soccer Federation Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01717 (C.D. Cal. March 8,
2019).
4 See id.
5 Title VII and the USWNT’s claims under the provision will not be addressed in this essay ; See Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1962).
6 See Compl. at 2:5-7; see also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1963).
7 See id. at 2:12-13.
8 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1) (1963).
9 See id.
1
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other factor other than sex, in its Answer to the Complaint. 10 The fourth defense, any factor other
sex, is overly broad in that it permits the Federation to assert any justification for the disparate
pay rate, besides the sex of the players.11 The wide ranging nature of this defense makes it nearly
impossible for the USWNT to bring a claim under the EPA. 12
The USWNT has been fighting for equal pay since 2005. 13 At that time, the women’s
team and the Federation were engaged in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which
outlined the terms of the USWNT’s pay rate. 14 Prior to the termination of the 2005 CBA, the
USSF and the USWNT agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that included a “no
strike, no lockout” provision, which applied during negotiations for the subsequent CBA.15 This
clause restricted the USWNT from refusing to play in any games or appear for any scheduled
appearances.16 Ultimately, in March 2016, three years prior to filing the current suit, the
women’s team filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
alleging violations for unequal pay as compared to the men’s team. 17 The EEOC began an
investigation into the USSF.18 While the investigation was pending, the USWNT was also unable
to strike or hold out against the USSF as per the “no strike, no lockout” provision. 19 In order to
reach some form of agreement for compensation while the EEOC investigation was pending, the
women’s team and the Federation struck a collective bargaining agreement in April 2017. 20

10

See Answer to Compl. at 17:2-5, Morgan v. United States Soccer Federation Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01717 (C.D.Cal.
March 8, 2019).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
12 See generally Sabrina L. Brown, Negotiating Around the Equal Pay Act: Use of the “Factor Other than Sex”
Defense to Escape Liability, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 471, 484 (2017).
13 See Patrick C. Coyne, A Huge Win for Equal Pay: Women’s National Teams Grab their Biggest Victories yet in
Recent Contract Dispute, 25 JEFFREY S. M OORAD SPORTS L. J. 315, 236 (2018).
14 See id.
15 See id. at 329.
16 See generally id.
17 See id. at 330.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 331.
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As a result of the courts narrow interpretation of the “same establishment” requirement
and “factor other than sex” defense included in the EPA, the USWNT was unable to negotiate
for equal pay in its collective bargaining agreement. 21 Even though the USWNT filed suit under
the Equal Pay Act, it faces two major barriers in bringing suit against the Federation.22 First, the
women’s soccer team will need to prove that it is employed by the same establishment as the
men’s soccer team, which is paid more for substantially equal work. 23 Second, the USWNT will
need to argue against the narrow “factor other than sex” defense. 24 At the time of the 2017 CBA,
the possibility of facing these challenges in a court case made it nearly impossible for the
USWNT to bring an EPA claim, therefore they entered into the 2017 CBA to earn some form of
payment.25 The ”same establishment” requirement and “factor other than sex” defense make the
EPA too restrictive for plaintiffs to seek protection under the Act.
In 2017, the year the women’s team entered into the most recent CBA with the USSF,
201 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforcement suits were filed in the federal
district courts.26 Of the 201 suits filed only eleven involved claims under the Equal Pay Act. 27
The limited number of suits filed under the EPA is evidence that the Act is too restrictive to
provide protection for plaintiffs.28 This trend was still true in 2019, when the women’s team filed
suit against the Federation under the Equal Pay Act. 29 In 2019, 157 EEOC enforcement suits

21

See generally id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
See Compl. at 1:8-9.
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
24 See id.
25 See Coyne, supra note 13, at 331.
26 See EEOC Litigation Statistics FY 1997 through FY 2019 , U.S. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm#fn1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
22
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were filed in the federal district courts, whereby only seven included EPA claims. 30 The Equal
Pay Act is interpreted too narrowly to adequately protect plaintiffs in all industries.
This essay argues that the “same establishment” requirement and “factor other than sex”
defense render the Equal Pay Act too restrictive to provide sufficient protection for plaintiffs.
This paper uses the litigation filings in Morgan et al. v. United States Soccer Federation to
illustrate the challenges plaintiffs face when bringing an EPA claim. Due to the private
ownership of sports teams, it is most difficult for a plaintiff in the professional sports industry to
establish an Equal Pay Act claim.31 The “same establishment” requirement and the “factor other
than sex” defense should be eliminated from the Equal Pay Act, to adequately protect plaintiffs
suffering from a disparate pay rate. Since these changes will benefit professional athletes in the
industry where it is most difficult to establish an EPA claim, they will also benefit plaintiffs in all
industries.
A comprehensive analysis of the limitations of the Equal Pay Act and its effect on the
USWNT’s suit begins in Part II. That section discusses the enactment and application of the Act.
The history of the EPA and its application in federal district courts is necessary to discuss in
order to explain how the restrictions in the Act fail to protect all plaintiffs. Part III uses the
Complaint and Answer to Complaint from the Morgan case to illustrate how the Equal Pay Act
is applied by the parties in the case.32 Analyzing the application of the Act in the Morgan case
provides a present example of the challenges plaintiffs must overcome due to the limiting
requirements in the Equal Pay Act.33 In Part IV, this essay suggests that eliminating the “same

30

See id.
See Nicole Zerunyan, Time's Up: Addressing Gender-Based Wage Discrimination in Professional Sports, 38 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. R EV. 229, 250 (2018).
32 See generally Compl.; See also Answer to Compl.
33 See Morgan v. United States Soccer Federation Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01717 (C.D.Cal. March 8, 2019).
31
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establishment” requirement and the “factor other than sex” defense will broaden the Equal Pay
Act in a manner that will adequately protect all plaintiffs. Part V concludes with a discussion of
how these changes will positively impact plaintiffs in all industries and contribute to the
scholarly discussion on Equal Pay Act reform.
II.

History of the Equal Pay Act and Its Application

In order to understand how the EPA hinders plaintiff’s ability to prevail on their claims, it is
necessary to briefly discuss the Act’s history and the reasons for its enactment. This Part
describes the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act and its goals. It then analyzes the elements
of an EPA claim. To fully explain the restrictions of the EPA, it is necessary to discuss the
federal courts narrow interpretation and application of each element in prior cases. This Part
flows chronologically from the enactment of the EPA to its application in federal courts today.
A.

Enactment of the Equal Pay
In 1945, the first equal pay bill was introduced in Congress. 34 The bill was based upon the

success of the War Labor Board’s general order which called for equal pay rates for comparable
equality and quantity of work.35 The proposal made in 1945 did not pass in Congress. 36 No other
similar proposal was deemed favorable until 1963. 37
Preparation for the 1963 Equal Pay Act began two years prior in 1961. 38 President John F.
Kennedy established a Presidential Committee to support the idea of equal pay for comparable
work.39 This standard would have allowed equal pay for jobs that had enough like characteristics

34

See Equal Pay Act: Hearing on S. 1178 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 79th Cong. 1 (1945).
See Albert H. Ross & Frank V. McDermott Jr, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1974) (discussing the background and legislative history of the EPA).
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
35
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or qualities that a comparison of the two would have been appropriate.40 Following hearings
conducted by the House Committee on Education and Labor in 1962, an amendment was passed
in the House of Representatives that required “equal pay for equal work.” 41 The sponsor of this
amendment specifically omitted the word “comparable,” recognizing the latitude for equal pay
that the word would have provided.42 Nevertheless, lawmakers agreed that “equal pay for equal
work” struck a fair compromise between both sides of the equal pay debate. 43 This amendment
made equal pay legislation possible.44
On June 19, 1963 President Kennedy signed equal pay protection into law through
amendment to § 206(d) of the Fair Labor Standard Act. 45 The structure of the Equal Pay Act as
an amendment to the existing Fair Labor Standards Act served two purposes. 46 First, the
amendment eliminated the need for a new bureaucratic structure. 47 It additionally facilitated
compliance with the Act.48 The purpose of the Act, as articulated by President Kennedy, was to
increase the number of women in the work force and address the issue of women being paid
wages less than men.49 Since its enactment, federal courts have been interpreting and applying
the elements of the Equal Pay Act more narrowly against plaintiffs. 50

40

See id.
See id. at 29.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 4.
44 See id.
45 See Donald Elisburg, Equal Pay in the United States: The Development and Implementation of the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 LAB. L. J. 195, 199 (1978); See also Fair Pay Act, 19 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
46 See H.R. R EP. NO. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. C ODE C ONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See Ross, supra note 36, at 4.
50 See generally Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1970).
41
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B.

Elements of an Equal Pay Act Claim

(1)

Equal Pay: Wages
In 1970, seven years after the enactment of the EPA, the Third Circuit decided one of the

earliest Equal Pay Act cases, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.51 In that case, the Secretary of Labor
brought an action against Wheaton Glass Co., claiming that it discriminated against its “female
selector-packers” by paying them at a rate which was ten percent less than the rate paid to “male
selector-packers.”52 In opposition, the company denied that female selector-packers performed
equal work as compared to male selector-packers.53 In the lower court, judgment was entered in
favor of the defendant, holding that the Secretary failed to meet the burden of proving that the
disparate pay rate was based on sex and that there were no other factors other than sex
establishing a reason for the disparate pay rate. 54 The Third Circuit overturned the district court’s
decision.55 It held that the Secretary met the burden of proof by demonstrating that male selectorpackers received a pay rate ten percent higher than female selector-packers and that both sexes
performed equal work.56
In rendering its judgment, the Third Circuit noted that Congress did not require that the jobs
be identical, but that they be substantially equal. 57 In the courts view, any other interpretation
would be contrary to the goals of the Equal Pay Act. 58 The Court explained that the Act sought to
overcome the belief that women were inferior to men and to eliminate the negative economic

51

See id. at 261.
See id.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 266.
57 See id. at 265.
58 See id.
52
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effects for female workers earning reduced wages. 59 One scholar noted that the Third Circuit was
instrumental in furthering the purposes of the Act in Shultz.60
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to apply the Equal Pay Act in 1974.61
The Court first considered the prima facie62 case under the EPA in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan.63 In that case, the Court consolidated two cases against the same company and resolved
conflicting rulings by the Second and Third Circuits.64 The Secretary of Labor brought an action
against Corning Glass Works in both the Second and Third Circuits claiming that the company
paid its night inspectors, who were all male, a higher wage than its day inspectors, who were all
female, and performed the same work.65 The Secretary alleged that the jobs were the same, save
for men performing the tasks at night and women performing the tasks during the day. 66
The Second Circuit found that the company’s pay structure was in violation of the Equal Pay
Act.67 It relied on a statement from the House Committee Report which noted that shift
differentials would be excluded as a factor other than sex. 68 Since the only difference was thus
the employee’s sex, the Second Circuit found an equal pay violation.69
On the other hand, the Third Circuit found that there was no equal pay violation for
compensating night shift workers more than day shift workers.70 The Third Circuit relied on a

59

See id.
See Brown, supra note 12, at 479-80.
61 See generally Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
62 “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his
opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence,
and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.” See Prima facie, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
63 See generally Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195.
64 See id. at 191.
65 See id. at 192.
66 See id. at 208.
67 See id. at 198.
68 See id.
69 See generally id.
70 See id.
60
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statement from the sponsor of the bill explaining that differences in shift would fall within the
difference in working condition factor of the Equal Pay Act. 71 Thus, the Third Circuit found that
since men and women worked different shifts, men at night and women during the day, there was
no violation in paying night shift workers at a higher rate.72 The Third Circuit’s holding in this
case indicates a shift toward a narrower interpretation of the Act, than the court applied in
Shultz.73
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court agreed with the broad interpretation applied by the Second
Circuit in finding that since the job of night shift workers was substantially equal to that of the
day shift workers, the day shift workers were entitled to the substantially higher rate paid to night
shift workers.74 The Supreme Court reiterated that this finding was consistent with the
Congressional intent of the EPA and furthered the goals of the Act. 75
In 1988, the Sixth Circuit shifted from a broad interpretation of the Act, which furthered
Congress’s goal of paying women at a rate equal to the rate paid to men for equal work, to the
narrower interpretation applied by federal courts today. 76 In EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission challenged J.C. Penney’s “head of household” provision
for medical and dental insurance plans, which permitted a J.C. Penney employee to elect
coverage for his or her spouse only if the spouse earned less than the employee. 77 The EEOC
argued that the provision had a disparate impact on female employees. 78 The Court held that

71

See id.
See id.
73 See id.; Contra Shultz, 421 F.2d at 266 (finding that male and female selector-packers performed equal work).
74 See id. at 208.
75 See id. at 207.
76 See generally EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988).
77 See id. at 250.
78 See id. at 251.
72
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while the provision did have a disparate impact on women, being the head of the household was
a “factor other than sex” sufficient to permit a difference in compensation of benefits. 79
The Shultz and Corning Glass Works cases indicate the courts’ willingness to interpret
the Equal Pay Act in a manner that furthers Congress’s goals of making women equivalent to
men and eliminating the negative effects of lower wages for women. 80 Conversely, the J.C.
Penney case is representative of the narrow reading of the Equal Pay Act applied by the federal
courts today.81 This reading is so limited that it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to satisfy the
elements of the Equal Pay Act.82
While the courts narrow interpretation of the Equal Pay Act makes it more difficult for
plaintiffs to successfully establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must allege facts to satisfy each
element of the Act.83 Plaintiffs must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of
opposite sexes for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions. 84 When evaluating whether two jobs are
sufficiently similar to warrant equal pay, the courts employ a substantially equal standard. 85
(2)

Substantially Equal Standard
Courts use the substantially equal standard to determine the degree of job similarity

required.86 Job titles or classifications alone are not sufficient to establish job similarity. 87 Rather,

79

See id.
See generally Brown, supra note 12, at 481.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1).
85 See Peter Avery, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was it Broken? How Can it Be Fixed? , 56 R UTGERS L. R EV.
849, 858 (2004).
86 See id.
87 See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 255 (2nd Cir. 2014); see also Lavin-McEleney v. Marist
Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the standard is not whether the plaintiffs job is identical to a
higher-paid position, but that the jobs compared must be substantially equal).
80

11

whether two jobs are substantially equal is based on the content of the job and the jobs having
the same common tasks.88
In EEOC v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered allegations by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the Port
Authority had a practice of paying non-supervisory female attorneys at rates lower than the rates
paid to male employees for substantially equal work. 89 The EEOC supported its Complaint by
claiming that attorneys of both sexes served the same client, had the same job descriptions, and
demanded the same degree of professional demeanor.90 The EEOC’s Complaint generally
claimed that all of the non-supervisory attorney jobs in the Port Authority’s law department are
substantially equal.91 Despite asserting identical evaluative criteria, such as “‘project
management,’ ‘communication,’ ‘flexibility and adaptability,’ and ‘attendance,’” the Court
found that these comparisons failed to address whether the attorneys faced the same level of
workplace demands.92 Without a finding regarding the level of workplace demand, the Court
determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the jobs were substantially equal. 93
In its holding, the Second Circuit reiterated that job codes are not indicative of the duties
performed.94 The Court held that the EEOC’s responses were insufficient to support a finding
that the attorneys work was substantially equal. 95
When the Court considers whether two jobs are substantially equal, a significant
differentiating task between the two jobs may negate the equality of the jobs. 96 It is up to the

88

See EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d at 255.
See id. at 250.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 258.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Avery, supra note 85, at 858.
89
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lawyers to adequately compare substantially similar jobs and the courts to evaluate the
counselor’s comparisons and differentiations between the skill, effort, and responsibilities of
comparators.97
(3)

Skill
A plaintiffs job may qualify as substantially equal under the Equal Pay Act if employees

have the same skills in order to perform either of the two jobs being compared. 98 In Ambrose v.
Summit Polymers, Inc., the Plaintiff designed molded plastic parts for automobiles as part of her
job as a “designer.”99 In this role, she was expected to perform both design work and lowerskilled detail work.100 However, she was assigned mostly lower-skilled detail work.101 The
Plaintiff brought a claim under the EPA alleging a disparate pay rate as compared to a higher
paid, male designer performing substantially equal work. 102 The employer indicated that the
Plaintiff performed mostly lower-skilled work and was therefore paid less since her work
required less skill.103 The Court considered whether the Plaintiff’s performance required equal
skill, effort, and responsibility in comparison to the performance of the male designer’s job. 104 In
finding that the jobs required an equivalent level of skill, the Court disregarded the employer’s
argument that the Plaintiff performed mostly lower-skilled work.105 The court concluded that the
Plaintiff’s job required performance of both higher-skilled and lower-skilled tasks.106 Even

97

See Kimberly J. Houghton, Equal Pay Act of 1963: Where did we go wrong? , 15 LAB. L. 155, 173 (1999).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a)
99 See Ambrose v. Summit Polymers, Inc., No. 05-1048, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7911, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2006).
100 See id. at *3.
101 See id. at *2.
102 See id. at *4.
103 See id. at *7.
104 See id. at *9.
105 See id. at *1.
106 See id. at *2.
98
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though she was assigned more of the lower-skilled work, it did not render her work unequal to
the male designers’ performance.107
(4)

Effort
Under the substantially equal standard, the element of effort refers to the level of mental and

physical exertion required for the jobs being compared.108 If there are substantial differences in
the degree of effort required to perform the jobs, the equal pay standard cannot apply even if the
jobs are equal in all other respects.109
The issue of whether two teaching positions required the same level of effort was presented
to the Seventh Circuit in Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs.110 Plaintiff, Director of the Respiratory
Therapy Program, alleged a disparate pay rate in violation of the Equal Pay Act as compared to
the male Program Director for Physical Therapy.111 In regards to effort, the Plaintiff alleged that
she had to exert more effort to secure outside funding to supplement her department’s resources,
which was an effort her comparator did not make. 112 The employer countered that the difference
in pay was due in part to the fact that the comparator was required to create Master’s and
Doctoral courses of study for the Physical Therapy program. 113 While the Court admitted that a
consideration of the Plaintiff’s effort decreased the disparity between the effort required by the
two positions, the effort to create Master’s and Doctoral courses of study required more effort

107

See id.; Despite successfully demonstrating that the Plaintiff’s job required substantially equal skill to the male
designers’ work, the Court still found that the disparate pay rate was not based on sex and granted the employer’s
summary judgment motion.
108 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a).
109 See id.
110 See generally Cullen v. Ind. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2003).
111 See id. at 696.
112 See id. at 699.
113 See id.
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than the plaintiff exerted in securing outside funding. 114 Even though the plaintiff exerted effort
in ways her comparator did not, the Court still found in favor of the employer. 115
The Court also ignored a study conducted by the University which indicated a significant pay
gap between its male and female faculty members. 116 An ad hoc review committee, established
to consider the issues raised by the study, strongly recommended that the Plaintiff’s pay be
increased to rectify the pay disparity between male and female employees. 117 Despite this
evidence in support of plaintiffs Equal Pay Act claim, a narrow application of the Equal Pay Act
still hindered her ability to prove that her job constituted substantially equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.118 In addition to alleging that a plaintiffs job is substantially equal in effort, the
jobs must also be substantially equal in level of responsibility. 119
(5)

Responsibility
The Court’s determination as to whether the jobs have substantially equal responsibility

turns on the degree of accountability required in the performance of the jobs and the importance
of the job obligation.120 Higher levels of responsibility may be based on supervisory duties or
minor authority not entrusted to other employees in the same position. 121
In Gunther v. Co. of Washington the Ninth Circuit found that the jobs of male and
female prison guards did not constitute the same level of responsibility. 122 The female Plaintiffs
guarded inmates in the female section of the county jail, while males, who were paid at a higher

114

See id.
See id.
116 See id. at 697.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 698.
119 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a).
120 See id.
121 See generally 29 C.F.R. §1620.17(b).
122 See Gunther v. Co. of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979).
115
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rate, guarded inmates in the male section of the county jail.123 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that
they were denied equal pay for equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act. 124 The Court
considered the fact that male guards were responsible for more inmates than the female guards
and the female guards performed more clerical duties.125 Plaintiffs argued that these differences
are insignificant and do not justify the disparate pay rate. 126 The Court disagreed with Plaintiff’s
argument, finding that the male guards were given significantly greater responsibility because of
the higher number of prisoners each guard was responsible for. 127 The Court found that the jobs
of the female guards was not substantially equal to that of the male guards, for they did not
require the same level of responsibility.128
The Plaintiffs in Gunther were unsuccessful in demonstrating that their jobs required
substantially equal responsibility, just as the Plaintiffs in each of the above mentioned cases
struggled to satisfy some element of the prima facie case of the restrictive Equal Pay Act.129 In
cases where a plaintiff asserts sufficient evidence to meet the prima facie case, they must also
prove that the work they perform is for the same establishment as the work performed by the
employee whom is paid higher for substantially equal work.130
As demonstrated by the case law in this area, it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove that
their job requires substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility to the job of a member of the
opposite sex who is paid more.131 In addition to overcoming the challenge of establishing that a

123

See id. at 1307.
See id.
125 See id. 1310.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 1309.
129 See generally id.
130 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
131 See generally Ambrose, No. 05-1048, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7911, at *2; Cullen, 338 F.3d at 699; Gunther, 623
F.2d at 1309.
124
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Plaintiff’s job is substantially equal, plaintiffs must also prove that they work for the same
establishment as a member of the opposite sex who is paid more for substantially equal work. 132
(6)

Same Establishment
For plaintiffs to be successful in claims under the Equal Pay Act they must prove each

element of the prima facie case discussed in subheadings one through four. 133 To this effect,
plaintiffs must prove that the employer pays a member of the opposite sex for a job that is
substantially equal in effort, skill, and responsibility to the job performed by the plaintiff. 134 In
addition to satisfying all of these elements, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they work for the
“same establishment” as the employee being paid more for substantially equal work. 135
In reference to the Equal Pay Act, same establishment refers to a distinct physical place of
business, not the entire business enterprise.136 The entire organization may operate out of
different physical locations.137 Each separate physical place of business is considered a separate
establishment under the EPA.138 In unusual circumstances two or more business locations may
be considered as one entity.139 Unusual circumstances, such as where there is centralized control
over the business, may constitute one establishment. 140 Centralized control includes a common
administrative body which conducts hiring, sets wages, and assigns work locations to
employees.141 Centralization may also include employees frequently changing work locations
and having daily duties virtually identical to the duties performed by employees at a different

132

See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a).
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b).
140 See id.
141 See id.
133
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location under similar working conditions. 142 Except for these unusual circumstances, the term
“establishment” is used to describe one physical location of the business. 143
The Supreme Court found one of the unusual circumstances where more than one location of
a business constitutes the “same establishment” in Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Independent
School Dist.144 In that case, the Secretary of Labor filed suit against the Goose Creek
Consolidated Independent School District for paying its female janitors less than it paid its male
janitors.145 The school district was comprised of thirteen different schools. 146 Thus, the school
district argued, in part, that the Secretary could not properly file an Equal Pay Act claim because
the schools should not be treated as the “same establishment.” 147 The Court found that “[c]entral
control and administration of disparate job sites can support a finding of a single establishment
for purposes of the EPA.”148
While all of the schools in a district constituted the same establishment in Goose Creek, this
case is an example of one of the few unusual circumstances where multiple physical locations
constitute one establishment.149 This exception is reserved for only a few “unusual
circumstances” and is not the usual finding by the Courts. 150
In fact, in Renstrom v. Nash Finch Co., the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota made a contrary finding.151 In that case, the Plaintiff alleged that she was paid less
than two other head grocery buyers, whom were male, and performed equal work at different
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distribution centers than the one she worked at.152 The Plaintiff argued that all of the distribution
centers constituted the “same establishment” because the Vice President for food distribution for
the Midwest region had ultimate authority over all head grocery buyers and other employees at
the distribution centers.153 She claimed his authority overrode the decisions of division managers
and that the businesses corporate office created a single job description for all head grocery
buyers in the company.154 The Plaintiff alleged that this type of central control fit into the type of
“unusual circumstance” that warrants one enterprise. 155 The Court disagreed and found that the
type of central control Plaintiff relied upon was commonplace. 156 The evidence did not
demonstrate the same degree of centralized control exercised by the school district in Goose
Creek.157 The Court held that the business did not constitute the “same establishment.” 158
Even though there are plaintiffs, such as those in Goose Creek, who successfully established
that the employer constituted one entity, these circumstances are unusual. 159 A finding that
multiple locations are in fact one entity is not typically the finding of the courts when evaluating
the “same establishment” requirement.160 The Renstrom case more realistically illustrates the
federal courts narrow interpretation of the “same establishment” requirement. 161
The narrow application of the “same establishment” requirement is representative of the
Courts interpretation of the Equal Pay Act today. 162 A reading this limited makes it nearly
impossible for an employee working for a large company in any industry that operates out of
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multiple locations to prove that they are working for the “same establishment” as an employee of
the opposite sex who is paid more for substantially equal work at a different location. 163
Once a plaintiff proves the elements of its prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act and
satisfies the “same establishment” requirement, they have another barrier under the Act. 164 The
EPA provides employers with several different affirmative defenses, which make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.165 The affirmative defenses available to defendants under the
Equal Pay Act can also disadvantage plaintiffs. 166
C.

Defenses Available Under the EPA
If a Plaintiff proves a disparate pay rate by establishing the prima facie case and satisfying

the “same establishment” requirement, then the burden shifts to the employer to justify the
difference in pay based on one of the Act’s four defenses. 167 The fourth available defense, a
differential based on any other factor other than sex, is a catchall defense, which permits
employers to assert any reason other than the employees sex as an explanation for the disparate
pay rate.168 Since any “factor other than sex” is used as an affirmative defense, the employer has
the burden of production and persuasion.169 When asserting the “factor other than sex” defense,
the employer must prove that the factor asserted is the reason for the disparate pay rate and that
the difference in pay is not due in part to the employees sex. 170
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The Seventh Circuit held in King v. Acosta Sales that factors such as education and
experience can qualify as a factor other than sex. 171 In that case, a former business manager
alleged in part that Acosta Sales paid women less than men for substantially equal work. 172 All
of the men were paid higher than all of the women in the company, even though men and women
performed the same jobs.173 The company claimed that education and experience account for the
disparate pay rate between male and female employees. 174 In the district court, the employer was
successful in alleging that the difference in pay was due to higher levels of education and
experience in male employees.175 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court
erred in permitting the employer to point out this difference without proving that the difference
in education and experience actually accounted for the difference in pay. 176 The Court reversed
summary judgment in favor of the employer, for the statute required that the employer prove that
the higher levels of education and experience were actually the reasons for the disparate pay rate
between men and women.177
Differences in experience and education are often considered acceptable factors other than
sex.178 Courts also consider “market forces” as a “factor other than sex.” 179 These forces relate to
the market rate for an employee of a certain experience or education level. 180 Some circuits also
accept prior salary as a justifiable “factor other than sex” for the difference in pay. 181 Use of prior
salary may be an acceptable factor even if it is not related to the current job nor business
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related.182 Lastly, some, but not all circuits, require the factor other than sex to relate to a
legitimate business reason.183
One scholar noted that the Equal Pay Act lacks specificity as to what factors qualify as
factors other than sex.184 This scholar claims that due to the lack of detail in the statute, courts
have applied the defense inconsistently.185 This often leads to success for employers and makes it
more difficult for employees to successfully seek equal pay protection under the Equal Pay
Act.186 Circuits adopting a broad reading of the Act claim that a broad reading of the “factor
other than sex” defense is justified by the word “any” in the statute, but this interpretation
permits employers to escape liability under the Equal Pay Act. 187
The “factor other than sex” defense is interpreted to be so limiting to plaintiffs it renders the
Act effectively useless as equal pay protection. 188 Even if a plaintiff is successful in proving a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, they can still be unsuccessful in their claim if the
employer effectively asserts one of the four defenses under the Act. 189 The next section will
illustrate how even when a plaintiff has strong evidence to support an Equal Pay Act claim, their
success can still be uncertain due to the court’s narrow interpretation of the “same establishment”
requirement and “factor other than sex” defense. 190
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III.

An Illustration of the Effects of the EPA on Morgan et al. v. USSF

The cases discussed in the prior section illustrate how the court’s narrow application of the
Equal Pay Act can make it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to be successful in a claim under the
EPA.191 This section uses the women’s soccer team’s case, Morgan et al. v. USSF, to
demonstrate how even when plaintiffs have favorable facts for its side, that are seemingly more
supportive for its claim than facts in prior cases, the restrictions of the Equal Pay Act can still
make the outcome uncertain.192 It discusses each element of the prima facie case in reference to
the allegations made by the women’s team in its Complaint. 193 This section discusses the United
States Soccer Federation’s Answer to the Complaint to illustrate how the employer can
undermine the prima facie case and use the affirmative defenses to its advantage. 194 The United
States Women’s Soccer Team’s case is one in which the plaintiffs would have a better chance of
success due to the favorable facts for its side, however, it is still limited to the narrow
requirements of the Equal Pay Act.195
A.

Elements of the Equal Pay Act Claim

(1)

Equal Pay: Wages
To demonstrate that the women’s team is in fact paid less than the men’s team for the same

work, it needs to prove that its wages are lower.196 Wages include: “salary, profit sharing,
expense account, monthly minimum, bonus, uniform cleaning allowance, hotel accommodations,
use of a company car, and gasoline allowance.”197 In its Complaint, the USWNT uses twenty
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games as a baseline to calculate the difference in wages between its team and the men’s team. 198
If each team played twenty games per year, WNT players would earn up to $99,000 or $4,950
per game, as compared to MNT players who would earn up to $263,320 or $13,166 per game. 199
At a rate of twenty games, women’s team players would be paid 38% of the compensation of
similarly situated men’s team players.200 In further support of its allegation, the USWNT offers
two statistics from previous years to establish a difference in pay rate. 201
From 2013-2016 USWNT players earned only $15,000 for being asked to try out for the
World Cup team and making the roster.202 In comparison, men’s team players earned $55,000 in
2014 for trying out and making the World Cup team roster and USMNT players could have
earned $68,750 for making the World Cup team roster in 2018. 203
The USWNT further bolsters its argument in support of this difference by evaluating both
team’s performance bonuses.204 In 2014, USMNT players were awarded performance bonuses
totaling $5,375,000, even though they lost in the Round of 16. 205 The following year, in 2015,
the Federation provided the women’s team with only $1,725,000, even though they won the
entire tournament.206 Despite this clear difference in pay for female USWNT soccer players as
compared to male USMNT soccer players, the USSF rejected requests made by the women’s
team in 2017 for compensation equal to that paid to men’s team players.207
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If the women’s team successfully proves that they are paid less than the men’s team, they
will also need to demonstrate that their work is substantially equal to that of the men’s team. 208
(2)

Substantially Equal
In the women’s soccer team’s case, substantially equal will turn on whether the WNT and

MNT’s jobs require substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, when focusing on the
actual duties performed, rather than the Women’s or Men’s title.209 The USSF job requirements
outlining the duties of the Plaintiffs and the MNT are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Be available for training and any games requested by the USSF
Maintain high level of soccer skills and physical condition
Avoid use of illegal or banned drugs and harmful substances
Serve as a soccer spokesperson and promote and develop the sport of soccer in the US
Grant all requests by the USSF to promote games and to participate in media interviews
and sessions
Participate in autograph sessions
Devote reasonably necessary time to serve as players and spokesperson
Comport themselves in a manner benefitting their positions as members of the WNT and
MNT, spokespersons, representatives of the USSF and the sport of soccer
Comply with the USSF’s rules and regulations.210

These requirements apply equally to players on the men’s and women’s teams. 211 The women’s
team will need to establish that the duties shared by its team and the men’s team require the same
level of skill, effort, and responsibility. 212
(3)

Skill
Skill is measured by the job’s performance requirements, such as education, training,

experience, and ability.213 The USSF requires that Plaintiffs and MNT players maintain soccer
skills, physical conditioning and overall health through rigorous training routines, certain
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nutrition, physical therapy, and other regimes.214 Players on both teams must attend camps and
practices, participate in skill development drills, and play scrimmages and other practice
games.215 In the USSF’s March 9, 2020 filing, the Federation alleged that “the job of MNT
player[s] requires a higher level of skill based on speed and strength than does the job of WNT
player[s].”216 In opposition, the women’s team refutes this claim by arguing that the inquiry
under the EPA is limited to the jobs in question and does not account for a comparison of the
individuals performing the jobs.217 Even if the USWNT successfully demonstrates that its job
requires an equal level of skill as that of the men’s team, it will also need to prove that it exerts
the same level of effort for its job.218
(4)

Effort
Effort refers to the level of mental and physical exertion. 219 Plaintiffs and MNT players

are expected to travel nationally and internationally for games, which are the same in length,
physical and mental demand, and playing environment and conditions. 220 Members of both teams
are required to perform and work in games throughout the United States and globally. 221 The
USWNT asserts that it actually exerts more than the men’s team, but is continuously paid less. 222
Plaintiffs spend more time practicing for and playing in games, participating in training camps,
traveling, and engaging in media sessions, than similarly situated men’s team players. 223
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While effort is one of the factors used by the courts to determine whether the jobs are
substantially equal, the court will also look at the level of responsibility for each job. 224
(5)

Responsibility
Responsibility refers to the degree of accountability required. 225 All players on the men’s

team and women’s team must adhere to the same set of rules for the game of soccer as
established by FIFA.226 Both teams play on the same size field, with the same size ball, and have
the same duration of games.227 In the March 9, 2020 filing, the Federation alleged that the MNT
gets more media attention and therefore has greater responsibility to the USSF. 228 The USWNT
opposes this claim by asserting that there is no evidence to support the claim that the women’s
team and men’s team have different responsibilities. 229
If the women’s team successfully proves that there is no merit in the Federation’s argument
and its jobs are in fact substantially equal, it finally will need to prove that it is employed by the
“same establishment” as the men’s team.230
(6)

Same Establishment
In its Complaint, the USWNT addresses each element of the prima facie case under the

Equal Pay Act and provides examples to support each claim, including that it is employed by the
same establishment.231 The USWNT argues that the women’s team and the men’s team are
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employed by the same employer because the Federation manages and controls every aspect of
the men and women’s teams.232
The Federation challenges the USWNT’s prima facie case under the EPA.233 It claims
that the women’s team and the men’s team are separate entities that do not comprise a single
enterprise.234 The USSF does admit that they employ women for the WNT and men for the
MNT, but asserts that they are not part of the same establishment, because they are not employed
to play for the same team.235
In addition to challenging the women’s team’s prima facie case and asserting that the
women and men’s teams are not the same establishment, the United States Soccer Federation
asserts two affirmative defenses under the Equal Pay Act to defend against the USWNT’s
claims.236
B.

Defenses Asserted
Even if the USWNT establishes a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, it’s claim may

fail if the Federation successfully asserts an affirmative defense.237 The USSF invokes the third
affirmative defense, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, and
the fourth affirmative defense, any factor other than sex, in proving that the difference in pay
between the women’s and men’s team is not a product of sex discrimination.238
First, the United States Soccer Federation asserts the third affirmative defense, a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. 239 A difference in quantity or
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quality of work is determined based on the facts, alleging more work or a higher quality of work,
on a case by case basis.240 The United States Soccer Federation argues that to qualify for the
World Cup, MNT players play more games than WNT players. 241 It explains that to qualify for
the Women’s World Cup, the WNT plays five games in one, two-week tournament.242 On the
other hand, to qualify for the Men’s World Cup, the MNT would need to play sixteen games
over the course of a two year period.243 The USSF also asserts that the MNT and WNT face
different quantities and qualities of international competition. 244 It claims that since the level of
competition faced by each team is different, no comparison can be made between their respective
performance and compensation.245
Finally, the USSF invokes the Act’s fourth defense, any factor other than sex. 246 The
Federation further relies on the WNT 2017 CBA as a factor other than sex to explain the
disparate pay rate.247 The USSF argues that the women’s team negotiated its salary differently
than the men’s team through its CBA.248 Therefore, the Federation claims that as a part of the
WNT’s agreement it negotiated for a guaranteed salary, rather than a pay-for-play structure that
the men’s team’s pay is based on.249 It further argues that the MNT and WNT negotiated their
CBA’s at different times.250 The USSF relies on the timing of the negotiations of the CBA’s as a
reason for the lag in the WNT’s compensation. 251 It explains that “disparities in ticket revenue

240

See Zerunyan, supra note 31, at 246.
See Das, supra note 1.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See Ans. to Compl. at 11: 24-26.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 17:2-5.
247 See id. at 17:5; see also id. at 7:21-22.
248 See Honey Campbell, Superior Play, Unequal Pay: U.S. Women's Soccer and the Pursuit for Pay Equity , 51
U.S.F. L. R EV. 545, 568 (2017).
249 See id.
250 See id. at 568.
251 See id.
241

29

shares and per diem are the result of these different CBA cycles.” 252 The USSF asserts that in
2013 when the men’s team’s agreement went into effect, the women’s per diem was equal to the
men’s.253 However, the USSF alleges that as per the men’s team’s agreement, financials
increased from the first quad to the second quad causing the discrepancies. 254 The Soccer
Federation further argues that compensation for the World Cup differs because FIFA allocates
differences in pay for the winners of the women and men’s tournaments.255
In effect, the Federation counters the women’s team’s suit in three ways. 256 First, it attacks
the USWNT’s prima facie case on the “same establishment” requirement. 257 Even though the
USSF employs members of both teams, it claims that since it is not one establishment, the
women’s team does not have a basis to demand to be paid equal to the men’s team. 258 If the court
finds that the USWNT and the USMNT are in fact employed by the same establishment under
the Federation, it asserts two defenses to justify the disparate pay rate. 259 Under the third
affirmative defense, the USSF claims a difference in the number of games played and differing
levels of international competition supports a difference in pay. 260 Under the fourth defense, the
USSF relies on the women’s team’s CBA as a justification for the disparate pay rate.261
The Morgan et al. v. USSF case demonstrates that even when the facts are in the
plaintiff’s favor, it is still nearly impossible to succeed in a suit under the Equal Pay Act.262 The
courts narrow interpretation of the Act can still force plaintiffs to enter into unfavorable pay
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structure agreements with their employers, rather than attempt to overcome the restrictive Equal
Pay Act.263
IV.

Improvements to Broaden the Equal Pay Act

The previous section served as an example of how a narrow interpretation of the elements of
the Equal Pay Act can make it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to succeed in their EPA claims,
even when the facts are in their favor.264 In 2019, 157 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission enforcement suits were filed in the federal district courts. 265 Only seven of those
157 claims—4.4 percent—included a claim under the Equal Pay Act. 266 The “same
establishment” requirement and the “factor other than sex” defense of the Equal Pay Act are so
limiting for plaintiffs that they choose to bring their claims under a different statute. 267 In the
same year, 2019, eighty-seven of the 157 EEOC enforcement suits filed involved a Title VII
claim.268 These statistics demonstrate that plaintiffs are less likely to bring claims under the
narrow Equal Pay Act.269 Filing equal pay claims under a statute other than the Equal Pay Act
undercuts the goals of the Act to pay women at the same rate as men. 270 Other statutes have also
proven inadequate to eliminate the problem of a disparate pay rate, since plaintiffs are still
suffering from a disparate pay rate today. 271 The Equal Pay Act should be rewritten, so that
courts may interpret the Act in a manner which adequately protects plaintiffs suffering from a
disparate pay rate and achieves equal pay between both sexes.
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Reforms to the Equal Pay Act are necessary to broaden the federal courts interpretation of the
Act, so that plaintiffs suffering from a disparate pay rate may successfully seek protection under
the EPA. This section proposes that Congress eliminate the “same establishment” requirement
under the Equal Pay Act by rewriting the statute in a way that mirrors the language in the
California Fair Pay Act (CFPA).272 Additionally, Congress should enact the federal Fair Pay Act
of 1999 (FPA) which has been introduced twenty times to eliminate the broad “factor other than
sex” defense.273 Arguably scholars will challenge that these changes are unnecessary. 274 This
section concludes by discussing why these counterarguments are insufficient to rebut the
proposed changes.
A.

California Fair Pay Act
While the federal Equal Pay Act applies in all states, some states, including California, have

enacted their own equal pay laws.275 The California Fair Pay Act of 1949 was similar to the
federal Equal Pay Act and purported that
[n]o employer shall pay any individual in the employer's employ at
wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex
in the same establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions. 276
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In 2016, California amended the California Fair Pay Act of 1949 to eliminate the “same
establishment” requirement.277 California’s new statute provides, “an employer shall not pay any
of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for
substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and
performed under similar working conditions.”278 Under the CFPA employees must be paid
equally for doing substantially similar work, even if they work in different establishments. 279 By
eliminating the geographical factor from the court’s interpretation of the “same establishment”
requirement, the California Fair Pay Act makes it easier for plaintiffs to assert equal pay
claims.280 Eliminating the “same establishment” requirement broadened the California Fair Pay
Act by permitting plaintiffs to sue their employers for equal pay for substantially equal work,
even if they do not work at the same location as their opposite sex counterpart. 281
Congress can include California Fair Pay Act’s elimination of the “same establishment”
requirement in its federal Equal Pay Act legislation. 282 Plaintiffs can enjoy similar success under
the federal Equal Pay Act if Congress eliminates the “same establishment” requirement. 283
B.

Fair Pay Act 1999
The Fair Pay Act would similarly serve plaintiffs suffering from a disparate pay rate by

broadening the federal courts interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. The FPA was introduced in
both the House and the Senate in March 1999 in an effort to amend the Equal Pay Act to prohibit
wage discrimination on the basis of sex, race, national origin, and other purposes. 284 The Fair
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Pay Act would expand protection against wage discrimination for work on equivalent jobs.285
Equivalent jobs are those whose duties require skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions that are equivalent in value, even if the jobs are dissimilar. 286 The Fair Pay Act would
also eliminate the fourth and broadest defense under the EPA which permits wage differentiation
based on any “factor other than sex.”287
Since the bill was introduced, no action has been taken to pass the measure. 288 It was
introduced in the House on March 24, 1999 and referred to the House Committee on
Education.289 While no action has been taken to move the bill beyond the introductory stage, it
has been introduced every subsequent year, most recently on April 2, 2019. 290 Presentation of the
bill for the past twenty years demonstrates Congress’s persistent recognition of the problems
with the EPA and the need for revisions to adequately protect plaintiffs suffering from disparate
pay rates.291 Consistent conversation about the failures of the Equal Pay Act will encourage
Congress to address the problem by enacting new legislation. 292 The National Committee on Pay
equity instituted Equal Pay Day annually on April 12 to encourage discussions about possible
solutions to rectifying the failures of the Equal Pay Act. 293 Supporters are hopeful that a national
day for Equal Pay will lead to the enactment of the Fair Pay Act.294
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Enacting the Fair Pay Act would permit individuals to file a claim for disparate pay rates if
they are performing equivalent jobs for separate entities and it would eliminate the “factor other
than sex” defense under the Equal Pay Act.295 The equivalent job factor present in the FPA
would alleviate the burden on plaintiffs of opposite sexes who perform equivalent work for
different entities.296
Furthermore, eliminating the “factor other than sex” defense would take away the catchall
justification that permits employers to assert any reason for the difference in pay rate between
male and female employees.297 Eliminating this defense would take away the large loophole it
creates for employers to escape liability. 298
C.

Separate Provision for Athletes
While this paper proposes reforms that will benefit plaintiffs in all industries, one scholar

argues for a sports-specific provision of the EPA.299 She purports that the “same establishment”
requirement makes it nearly impossible for professional athletes to prove they work for the same
establishment as their opposite sex counterparts, due to individual ownership of sports teams. 300
This scholar claims that merely eliminating the “same establishment” requirement would still
permit employers of professional athletes to escape equal pay liability by registering as a
separate employer and not a separate establishment. 301 Therefore, this scholar supports that a
sports-specific provision would treat all pay differences in professional sports as per se
discrimination.302 She alleges that under a sports-specific provision it would be illegal for
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separate entities that are so similar they could be one establishment, save for their separate
ownership, to pay athletes different wages based on gender, when performing similar work based
on skill, effort, and responsibility.303
Enacting a separate provision for professional athletes is not necessary if the other
recommendations in this essay are enforced. Eliminating the “same establishment” requirement,
similar to the language of the California Fair Pay Act, would enable athletes of the opposite sex
to bring a claim under the Equal Pay Act even if they play for separate entities.304 Scholars
advocating for the separate provision for athletes misconstrue the language of the California Fair
Pay Act by claiming that registering as a separate employer would allow them to escape
liability.305 The purpose of the California Fair Pay Act is to protect employees suffering from a
disparate pay rate as compared to employees performing substantially similar work for a
different entity.306 Even if professional sports teams registered as separate employers, employees
performing substantially similar work would be able to file a claim under the language of the
CFPA.307 If the federal legislature similarly eliminates the “same establishment” requirement
from the Equal Pay Act, the statute will also protect professional athletes, even if their employers
are registered as separate employers from their opposite sex counterparts. 308
Similarly, permitting claims to be filed based on equivalent jobs under the federal Fair Pay
Act would also permit plaintiffs to file equal pay claims, even if they are employed by a separate
establishment as their opposite sex counterparts. 309 Eliminating the “same establishment”
requirement would benefit all plaintiffs by necessitating separate establishments paying opposite
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sexes to do substantially equal work to pay each sex the same, regardless of the conjuncture or
separation of the entities.310 This reform would benefit professional athletes, as well as
employees in the retail, education, and legal fields who do the same work for different
establishments.311 A separate provision would not be necessary, for professional athletes would
be protected if the “same establishment” requirement under the Equal Pay Act is eliminated. 312
Eliminating the “factor other than sex” defense would also help to alleviate the burden on all
employees asserting a claim under the EPA, including professional athletes. 313 Without this
defense, employers would not have the advantage of a catchall defense and would need to assert
a specific justification under one of the other three defenses available under the EPA. 314
D.

Counterarguments
This paper’s proposed reforms will enable federal courts to interpret the Equal Pay Act more

broadly, in turn benefitting plaintiffs seeking equal pay protection under the Act. Despite the
advantages these proposed reforms will have for plaintiffs, some scholars will undoubtly counter
that they are inadequate or unnecessary. 315
For example, the California Fair Pay Act helps plaintiffs in their equal pay claims by
eliminating the “same establishment” requirement, however, employers can escape liability
under the CFPA by registering as separate employers. 316 Arguably scholars will assert that the
California Fair Pay Act does not adequately protect plaintiffs. 317 Nevertheless, employees
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working for separate employers would still be protected under the reforms to the Equal Pay Act,
because they will be able to file claims even if they are not employed by the same entity.318
Scholars may also counter that the Equal Pay Act should not be reformed to make it easier
for plaintiffs to assert equal pay claims because a difference in pay is representative of women’s
“choices.”319 They assert that women may choose to prioritize shorter work days to allow
flexibility for family caregiving.320 Some scholars further allege that employers should not bear
the financial burden of paying for women’s choices. 321 As scholars have argued, regardless of
how women choose to prioritize work and their familial responsibilities, women do not “choose”
economic disadvantage.322 This paper’s proposed reforms to the Equal Pay Act do not advocate
for higher pay for unequal work. Rather, this paper’s proposed reforms seek to equate the pay
rate of all sexes for work on substantially equal jobs.
Even though there will be opposition to the proposed reforms, eliminating the “same
establishment” requirement and the “factor other than sex” defense will broaden the Equal Pay
Act in a manner that courts can interpret to bring it closer to achieving its goal of requiring
employers to pay women performing equivalent work at the same rate as their male
counterparts.323
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V.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that Congress should incorporate the language of the California Fair
Pay Act into the Equal Pay Act to eliminate the “same establishment” requirement under the
EPA. Furthermore, it proposed that Congress should enact the federal Fair Pay Act first
introduced more than twenty years ago to eliminate the “factor other than sex” defense, which
will eliminate a catchall defense under the Equal Pay Act. These proposals would help the
United States National Women’s Soccer team, as well as plaintiffs in the education, retail, and
public service industries and any other industry where an individual is suffering from a disparate
pay rate as compared to a person of the opposite sex. 324 This paper seeks to start a conversation
among scholars about ways to broaden the Equal Pay Act to adequately serve plaintiffs seeking
equal pay protection.
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